















































Department of Marketing & Management 
University of Southern Denmark 
Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark 
 
Thorbjørn Knudsen 
Department of Marketing & Management 
University of Southern Denmark 
Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark 
Tel: +45 6550 1000 
Fax: +45 6615 5129 
E-mail: tok@sam.sdu.dk
 
Draft of March 2, 2006 
 
Abstract:  
A crucial problem of evaluating, discovering, and creating the value of resources remains at the 
center of the subject of business strategy. The present article draws on reliability theory to advance 
an analytical platform that can address part of this problem, the evaluation of resource value. 
Reliability theory offers a way to model managerial ability and to derive the evaluation properties 
of organizations, boards, teams and committees. It is shown how the problem of resource evaluation 
can be remedied by proper evaluation structures. An evaluation structure that is build out of a very 
few agents can achieve significant improvements. A simulation of the classical n-armed bandit 
problem shows how evaluation structures can help managers select innovations of better economic 
value. 
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 Organizational Design and Resource Evaluation
1 Introduction
The purpose of the present article is to provide a formal theoretical framework that
is useful in thinking about managerial evaluation of resource value. We concep-
tualize the judgmental ability of managers in the reverse; the higher the ability,
the less errors get made. Drawing on reliability theory, the judgmental ability of a
manager can be expressed as the probability of making two forms of error, rejecting
uses of high value (errors of omission) and accepting uses of poor value (errors of
commission). Using this speciﬁcation, we provide a way to model diﬀerent levels of
managerial ability and show how the eﬀect of alternative evaluation structures can
be extracted. Through examples, it is shown that an evaluation structure built out
of a few agents can achieve signiﬁcant improvements in joint evaluation of resource
value. A simulation of the classical n-armed bandit problem shows how evaluation
structures can help managers select resources of higher economic value.
We address a critical unsolved problem in the resource-based view (RBV) of
strategy relating to the evaluation of resource value. The problem of evaluating
resource value underlies both resource-picking and capability-building (Makadok,
2001). Firms create economic rents both from being more eﬀective than their rivals
in acquiring resources from the factor market (resource-picking) and in using existing
resources in more eﬀective ways (capability building). We suggest that the essence
of both of these problems concern imperfections in judgmental ability.
In order to understand how managers search for resource value, we must under-
stand the limits in managerial ability that constrain their search eﬀorts. Both in
the RBV (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999) and from a behavioral perspective (Levinthal &
March, 1981; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Lant & Mezias, 1990), it has been recognized
that limited rationality constrains the sample size of the alternatives considered.
Thus managers consider a limited set of possible resources that can be acquired and
they consider a limited set of ways that existing resources can be deployed. A more
fundamental issue of limits constraining the manager’s ability in evaluating the value
of resources, once identiﬁed, has been given scant attention. As the many studies
of entrepreneurship show, this problem of evaluating resource value is of critical im-
portance both when alternative resources are picked and when alternative ways of
deploying a resource are considered. Indeed, securing the best resources as well as
securing the best use of the ﬁrm’s resources are fundamental problems at the center
of research in business strategy (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003a, 2003b; Makadok, 2001;
Moran & Ghoshal, 1999). Resources are here deﬁned broadly as all kinds of assets
whose potential services can be used in production (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999).
3The resource-based view (RBV) of strategy has mainly focussed on sustaining
the competitive advantage in ﬁrms endowed with resources that have superior value.
Indeed, the RBV is silent on antecedents to the composition of the ﬁrm’s resource
portfolio, even though in the earliest formulations of the theory (Penrose, 1959),
managerial decision making on the composition of the ﬁrm’s resource bundle is a
central component of the theory. Even if a few exceptional recent contributions have
made signiﬁcant progress (in particular Makadok, 2001), a fundamental problem of
explaining how diﬀerential resource value is attained remains unsolved in the RBV.
The RBV asserts that ﬁrms attain competitive advantage if they possess or con-
trol (e.g. patented) resources with superior value and sustain this advantage if the
resources in question continue to be in limited supply (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982;
Barney, 1986, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Conner, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Lippman
& Rumelt, 2003a, 2003b). Most eﬀorts in this line of research have been directed to-
wards the identiﬁcation of conditions that sustain the value of a bundle of resources,
i.e., limits to imitation and substitution of valuable resources (Barney, 1991; Peteraf,
1993). These conditions secure limited diﬀusion of valuable resources – or functional
equivalents – into industry. More recent reﬁnements have extended these conditions
to encompass combinations of common resources that are co-specialized with re-
sources in limited supply (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003a, 2003b). Less is known about
the ways in which a ﬁrm attains and develops a valuable bundle of resources, i.e.
why some ﬁrms end acquire more valuable resources than their rivals (and divest
less valuable resources) and why some ﬁrms deploy resources in ways that create
more value than other ﬁrms do with similar resources.
A possible source of heterogeneity is the many ways a particular resource (e.g.
land) can be deployed (various crops are available, various alternatives may exist
such as the building of a holiday resort). A well-known industrial example is the
accidental combination of chemicals leading to the discovery of adhesive by 3M
scientists (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999). Indeed, new combinations of chemicals are
today generated and evaluated in a systematic way in order to enhance exploration
of new useful adhesives (Jones-Bey, 2004). Firms explore new combinations of using
their resources. If there are vast possibilities of using a resource, and there usually
are, some ﬁrms might well discover high value in particular uses while other ﬁrms ﬁnd
little value. This eﬀect is further augmented by considering new ways of combining
resources (both human and physical). The argument is that diﬀerential managerial
ability lies at the root of the diﬀerences in the value of deploying resource bundles
that are accumulated by ﬁrms. Similar problems of evaluation underlie and blends
with the assessment of value of resources that are acquired in factor markets, such
as the hiring of new employees.
We are here extending and complementing Makadok’s (2001) recent work in
suggesting that the problem of evaluating resource value underlies both resource-
picking and capability-building. In essence, we ﬁnd that evaluation is an important
determinant of diﬀerential value reaped in use of resources and thus of ﬁrm level
resource heterogeneity. A similar argument (even though not developed in detail
4here) applies to diﬀerential ability in picking resources. The wider implication for
the RBV is that we outline the contours of an explanation of the underlying sources
of heterogeneity (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003b; Peteraf & Bergen, 2003).
Limits to managerial ability lies at the root of the RBV as it does in theories
of entrepreneurship (Baumol, 2002). The issue shows up also in the large body of
literature on transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985) and the prop-
erty rights approach (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990). Whereas
managerial ability is an independent variable in the RBV and in the literature on
entrepreneurship, it is a dependent variable in the contractarian approaches. In the
RBV, ability is a determinant of managerial search and therefore the value of the
resource bundles that ﬁrms accumulate and the valuable uses that they discover. By
contrast, incentive problems give rise to misdirected actions and less eﬀort than may
be wished for. Contractarian approaches are invaluable in identifying the situations
in which incentive problems arise and the remedies that may alleviate such problems
(see Makadok, 2001, 2003 for a treatment of incentive problems). When incentive
problems are remedied, less error get made and the managerial ability eﬀectively
increases. In the following, we abstract from incentive problems, in order to focus
on the issue of managerial ability.
The article is organized in the following way. Section 2 develops the model of
individual level managerial ability, section 3 shows how evaluation structures can be
designed to enhance individual level managerial ability, section 4 uses the n-armed
bandit problem to show how evaluation structures may beneﬁt managerial search,
and section 5 outlines implications for research. Section 6 concludes the article.
2 Discovery of resource value
To maintain focus and clarity of exposition, the present article is concerned with the
discovery of resource value in deployment of resources. The evaluation perspective
developed here can be extended in a straightforward manner to the problem of
evaluating resources that are acquired in factor markets. A detailed treatment of
this topic is left for future work.
The discovery of resource value involves better use of existing resources as well as
the classical case of innovation, deﬁned as the combination of resources in novel ways
(Moran & Ghoshal, 1999; Schumpeter, 1934). A manager chooses among possible
uses of a resource (e.g. chemical compounds or land) on the basis of an imperfect
evaluation of the value of these possible uses. This evaluation may include activities
associated with innovation (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999), such as the consideration of
uses where resources are combined with other resources in novel ways (e.g. new
chemical compounds or land in combination with new crops). Even though dif-
ﬁculties in discovery of resource value arise from various speciﬁc causes (such as
imperfect information about the uses of a particular resource and the way resources
can be combined in use), there is a general problem of designing organizations that
5can mitigate the consequences of imperfect evaluation.
The present article provides a formal analytical platform that is useful in tackling
speciﬁc design problems as regards evaluation of resource value. In our formal model,
the possible uses of a resource is captured in a random variable ˜ x. Each use is
represented by a vector of perfect signals, x, about its quality, capturing all of the
elements that are of relevance if the manager accepts a particular use of a resource.
The vector of perfect signals maps onto a scalar economic value, y = P(x), a net
income that is obtained by the manager if a particular use is chosen. This scalar
valuation is the value-in-use of a resource, including all of the relevant beneﬁts and
costs. The costs of making the decision is not included in the income because it is
endogenous to the evaluation process. The costs of making the decision depends on
the size of the evaluation structure (the number of agents involved in evaluation),
the levels of pay, the choice of compensation method (e.g. ﬁxed salary or pay per
evaluation), and the possibility of economies of scale with respect to evaluation.
Drawing on the standard search model, dating back to Stigler (1962), Lippman
& Rumelt (2003b) illustrate a possible way of modelling the discovery of resource
value. Deﬁne the cumulative distribution H(y) of values in use, y = P(x). The cost
of examining a new use is k > 0, and a ﬁxed reservation value, ξ, determines when




(y − ξ)dH(y) (1)
Assuming that the manager makes no errors of judgement, more productive
search of proﬁtable uses can simply be expressed as a smaller inspection cost (Lipp-
man & Rumelt, 2003b). In this case, a manager with a smaller inspection cost (k),
has a larger reservation value (ξ) and therefore engages in more search for alternative
uses. As a result, this manager has a greater expected net proﬁt, and, on average,
concludes search having located better alternative uses.
A lower inspection cost results in a larger sample of possible uses. This spec-
iﬁcation is consistent with the idea that limited rationality is expressed as limits
to the size of the subset of alternatives that the agent is able to consider (Simon,
1955; 1956). Yet, deeper issues regarding the nature of managerial ability remain
unanswered. First, the nature of the agent’s sample process is ignored. It seems
reasonable, however, to think of low managerial ability also in terms of a misguided
sampling process. If a manager systematically searches in all the wrong places, a
larger sample is not necessarily a blessing. Second, a more able manager might be
thought of as being more creative. Within the parameters of the standard search
model, creativity can be thought of as a transformation that shifts the distribu-
tion H(y) towards more valuable uses. Third, the manager’s ability to evaluate the
value of alternative uses may be limited. The remainder of the article focusses on the
evaluation problem and leaves the treatment of sampling processes and creativity
to future work.
62.1 Managerial fallibility
We wish to address the problem of evaluating the alternative uses of a resource in the
more realistic case where the manager makes errors of judgement. The ability of a
manager can be expressed as the probability of making two forms of error, rejecting
uses of high value (errors of omission) and accepting uses of poor value (errors of
commission). Value is here the simple rent as deﬁned by Lippman & Rumelt (2003a,
2003b). For a given cost per time unit of inspecting a possible use of a resource, the
manager wishes to minimize both forms of error. If there is error in judgement of
value, Equation 1 cannot be used.
The error has two eﬀects. First, the manager will on average discover less valu-
able uses. Second, the manager’s search activity is inﬂuenced. For a given inspection
cost, k, a manager that makes an error of commission will stop search prematurely,
and a manager that makes an error of omission will continue to search even if a use
that meets the reservation value was found. The probability of stopping search, S,
in the case where the evaluation is error-free is
P(S|y > ξ) = 1 ∧ P(S|y < ξ) = 0 (2)
and the probability of stopping search in the case of imperfect evaluation is
P(S|y > ξ) < 1 ∧ P(S|y < ξ) > 0 (3)
The individual manager’s ability in evaluating the possible uses of a resource is
conveniently expressed as the agent screening function, f(x), which is a probability
measure mapping each vector of signals about value-in-use onto a probability that
the manager accepts a possible use of a resource and stops search.
An omniscient manager would not make a single error of judgment. Such a man-
ager, Eric, is illustrated in Figure 1. Eric would process all of the perfect signals
about the true value-in-use without noise. The omniscient manager, Eric, there-
fore stops search and accepts a possible use of a resource with the economic value
P(x) > ξ (< ξ) with probability f(x) = 1 (0). That is to say, the agent screening
function of the omniscient manager is fΘ(x) ≡ Θ(P(x) − ξ), where Θ is the Heav-
iside step-function. In Figure 1, the reservation value, ξ, is set to 0, and Eric’s
screening function is the step-function that assigns zero probability to accepting a
use with value below zero. Uses with values equal to or above zero is accepted with
probability one.
All real managers are fallible; they occasionally make errors of judgment even
though well-intentioned (Stiglitz, 2002). In ﬁnance, accounting and elsewhere (there
are many references supporting this claim, too many to begin quoting), a commonly
acknowledged source of such error is the variation in information quality. Signals
are noisy. In the RBV, Makadok (2003), has used a similar conceptualization of
information quality as noisy signals.
Using the common analogy from statistical inference, managers accept a possible
use of a resource that should be rejected (Type II error) and they reject a possible
7use that should be accepted (Type I error). It is the limitations in the cognitive and
sensory apparatus that makes the manager fallible; noise decreases the information
that a manager can extract from a signal, which introduces error in judgment.
Figure 1: Judgmental bias and diﬀerent levels of discriminating
ability.
With noisy quality signals, the ability to pass judgment (about quality) is imper-
fect. That is, the discrimination between the value of alternative uses of a resource
becomes uncertain with noise. In consequence, with very high levels of noise, it be-
comes diﬃcult to tell which of the possible uses of a resource that is most valuable.
In the most extreme case (a limit case that may not be reached in actual practice),
the manager might completely loose the ability to discriminate; the manager simply
processes signals about the value-in-use by ﬂipping a coin, f(x) = 1/2. The manager
Albert in Figure 1 has no discriminating ability. In the case of noiseless processing
(as in standard textbook exonomics), the manager has perfect discriminating ability;
Eric is omniscient and assigns signals about value-in-use to acceptance or rejection
of a particular use in a deterministic way. In the general case the level of noise in
the manager’s processing of signals is the measure
Z
x
|fΘ(x) − f(x)|dx. (4)
In particular cases, it is useful to make a distinction between noise and bias. Bias
is a deviation from symmetry in agent screening, whereas noise is captured in the
slope of the screening function (Ben-Yashar & Nitzan, 1997). In Figure 1 the level of
judgmental ability (captured in the slope of the screening function) increases from
Albert the coin-ﬂipper to Eric the perfect evaluator. Thus, Albert, Bo, Dick and
8Eric have diﬀerent levels of unbiased judgmental ability. By contrast, the manager
Christie suﬀers from a judgmental bias even if her judgmental ability is generally
high. Christie’s judgmental ability is equal to Dick’s, but her optimistic bias leads
her to accept uses even with values below the reservation value, ξ. If opportunities
for uses were evenly distributed around ξ, Christie’s business would do less well than
Dick’s. When there is a diﬀerence between the judgmental ability of two managers,
holding constant the inspection cost, k, there is a diﬀerence in the economic result
they will experience.
More generally, this diﬀerence in judgmental ability is a particularly important
expression of asymmetric information, giving rise to heterogeneity in resource value
as argued in the RBV (Barney, 1986, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Foss & Knudsen, 2003;
Lippman & Rumelt, 2003b). Absent ﬂuctuations in the value-in-use, a more able
manager will assemble resources of higher value and direct resources to more produc-
tive uses, a conclusion that is similar to Makadok’s (2001). Thus higher judgmental
ability can be a source of greater expected net proﬁt. As shown in the following, how-
ever, a high level of ﬂuctuations in resource value can lead to the counter-intuitive
conclusion that a less able manager may enjoy greater expected net proﬁt than a
more able manager. Heterogeneity in resource value is a critical and so far unex-
plained assumption in the RBV (Barney, 1986, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Lippman &
Rumelt, 2003a).
The present article traces such heterogeneity to two sources, asymmetric in-
formation and complementarities, which aligns with Lippman & Rumelt’s (2003b)
analysis. In our analysis, asymmetric information arises from diﬀerential judgmental
ability at the individual level. Complementarities, in contrast, arise from evaluation
structures. As shown in the following, some evaluation structures will enhance, and
others diminish, judgmental ability at the organizational level even though organi-
zation members have identical ability.
3 Enhancing judgmental ability through evalua-
tion structures
A manager is located in an evaluation structure including n members. The task of
the evaluation structure is to decide which uses of a resource to accept and which to
reject. Its objective is to maximize income P(x) net of evaluation costs or, in some
cases, to minimize the incidence of Type-I and Type-II error. The focus is shifted
towards the latter objective in the case of evaluating the investments in resources
that are critical because they can ruin the ﬁrm. In order to address issues of income
maximization, we must ﬁrst understand how the incidence of Type-I and Type-II
error can be minimized. The present eﬀort is therefore focussed on the design of
reliable evaluation structures in the sense that they minimize the incidence of Type-I
and Type-II error subject to the constraints of the number of available evaluators
and their ability.
9Note, in the case of perfect decision-making ability, the evaluation structure has
no eﬀect because not a single error is made; all possible uses of a resource that meet
the reservation value would be accepted and other uses rejected. In all realistic
cases errors get made (Stiglitz, 2002). Therefore, the problem of designing reliable
evaluation structures is a critical issue in business strategy, both from a theoretical
perspective and in practice.
3.1 From agent to evaluation structure
Consider a system of fallible managers that are homogenous in their decision-making
ability. The source of error is noise in the processing of signals about the quality of a
resource. Each individual manager has access to two distinct types of communication
channels, one is used in the case that a resource (and its possible uses) is accepted
and the other in case of rejection. It is the availability of both of these channels of
communication that allow the evaluators to make the independent deliberate choices
that are characteristic of human agents.
The evaluation structure is modelled as a graph. Each node represents a manager
and each edge represents a channel of communication. We focus on homogenous
graphs (one type of agent, A) with two types of edges (accept/reject). The entry and
the exit of a resource are determined by the way the internal structure is connected to
three external nodes: (1) the initial portfolio (I) containing the distribution of signals
about the quality of resources ˜ x, (2) the ﬁnal portfolio (F) where the accepted ways
of using a resource are implemented, and (3) the termination node (T) where the
rejected ways of using a resource are dumped. The design of the evaluation structure
involves the speciﬁcation of the edges that connect members, the speciﬁcation of
the edges that connect the internal structure, through some of its members, to the
external nodes (I, F, T), and the speciﬁcation of the rules that determine how many
times a member can evaluate the same project (a truncation rule).
The generalization of the agent screening function f to the level of a speciﬁc
architecture G is the graph screening function FG. The graph screening function
is an aggregation rule that assigns individual decisions of acceptance and rejection
to any structure. It can be viewed as a generalization of the aggregation rules that
have previously been used to model decision-making in the case of committees (Ben-
Yashar & Nitzan, 1997; Sah & Stiglitz, 1988). In mathematical reliability theory,
the graph screening function is know as the system reliability (Lomnicki, 1973) or
the reliability function of a network (Carlsson & Grenander, 1966).
It is often useful to express the graph screening in terms of a reduced graph
screening function. In the case of homogenous ability, the graph screening function
is a polynomial in α ≡ f(x) commonly known as the reliability polynomial.1 An
evaluation structure can improve the reliability of the decisions that get made. To see
how, consider a hierarchical evaluation structure made of n agents. In a hierarchy,
1 In the case of j levels of heterogeneous ability, αj ≡ fj(x), the graph screening function is a
multinomial in αj.
10Figure 2: Example of evaluation structures. A 3-member hierarchy,
a 3-member polyarchy, and the self-dual graph G∗ used to steepen
the graph screening function. Full lines are acceptance edges and
dashed lines are rejection edges.
each agent can reject a possible use of a resource, but every agent must accept it
before a ﬁnal acceptance is reached in the structure. The evaluation structure is a
polynomial and the screening function, or reliability polynomial, of the hierarchy is
particularly simple. Its screening function is
FHn(α) = α
n (5)
A ﬂat evaluation structure, referred to as a polyarchy by Sah & Stiglitz (1988), is
the exact opposite of the hierarchy. In a polyarchy, each agent can accept a possible
use of a resource, but every agent must reject before a use is ﬁnally rejected by the
structure. Its screening function is
FPn(α) = 1 − (1 − α)
n (6)
It can be shown (Christensen & Knudsen, 2004), that ﬁnite hierarchies (pol-
yarchies) map the agent screening of any project closer to 0 (1) than any other
structure with the same number of agents (provided the agents are homogenous in
ability). The implication is that hierarchies and polyarchies tend to reduce only one
form of error.
3.2 Removing bias and improving the ability to discriminate
An evaluation structure can be designed to remove a bias or to improve the discrim-
inating ability above the level of the individuals that are part of the structure. We
ﬁrst consider the removal of bias. The number of agents that are required to reduce
the incidence of Type-I and Type-II error to some minimal desired level is provided
11below in Theorem 1. This result is useful for design purposes and follows trivially
from the graph screening functions of the n-member hierarchy Hn (Equation 5) and
polyarchy Pn (Equation 6)
Theorem 1
Given any threshold 0 < δ < 1 and a point α0 ∈]0,1[, the number of agents n in a











We now illustrate how evaluation structures can be designed to minimize man-
agerial fallibility and thus minimize the error in managerial search. It is useful
to divide the procedure in two steps. Step one removes any bias in the screening
function and step two further improves the discriminating ability of the unbiased
screening function. Consider the biased screening function of Christie in Figure 1. In
order to make things simple, the quality signal is a scalar, y, and Christie’s screening
function is
α = f(y) =
1 + tanh(y + 1)
2
(9)
A CEO wants to employ an evaluator, but he knows that the available evaluators
are too optimistic. Assume, the available evaluators have a screening function like
Christie’s. The CEO knows he must use a hierarchical structure to reduce or perhaps
even remove the optimistic bias. How large should the hierarchy be? In Christie’s
case, ξ = 0 and α0 = f(ξ) ∼ 0.88. By contrast, for an unbiased (imperfect)
screening function α0 = 0.50. Assume that the CEO’s target is to build a structure
that achieves FHn(α) 6 δ = 0.55, i.e., the CEO accepts a tolerance of 10% from the
target of the unbiased screening function of 0.50.
According to Theorem 1, the CEO ﬁnds that a hierarchy of n > log(δ)/log(α0)
∼ log(0.55)/log(0.88) ∼ 4.68 will meet his target. A comparison of the four- and
ﬁve-member hierarchy leads to the conclusion that the resulting unbiased evalua-
tion structure is a hierarchy employing ﬁve evaluators, all with a bias similar to
Christie’s. The manager has designed an unbiased evaluation structure from biased
members. Its screening function is shown in Figure 3. The unbiased evaluation
structure is a source of competitive advantage for this manager. Should another
manager for some reason decide to design a ﬂat evaluation structure, it would have
12an even more severe optimistic bias than Christie’s screening function. Clearly, this
ﬂat structure would be at a disadvantage if it competed against the ﬁve-member
hierarchy. Note also, had Christie’s bias been pessimistic, the manager should have
chosen a ﬂat, polyarchical structure to remove the bias. Evaluation structures are
potential sources of advantage and disadvantage. For this reason, both researchers
and practitioners gain from insights into their properties.
Figure 3: Removal of bias and further improvement of judgmental
ability.
We have now shown how a bias that inﬂuences managerial evaluation can be
removed such that the rate of Type I and Type II errors are balanced around the
manager’s reservation value, ξ. By choosing an appropriate design, including both
hierarchical and polyarchical elements, it is possible to achieve further improvements
that reduce both Type I and Type II error. In order to achieve this, the manager
must use a so-called self-dual evaluation structure. Such an evaluation structure
achieves a symmetric improvement of a screening function. It can be shown that
the self-dual graph used here is the best choice if the manager will build a small
evaluation structure (including less than 9 agents). In order to use the self-dual
graph, the manager hires ﬁve unbiased evaluators and place them in the structure,
G∗, as shown in Figure 2. If the only available evaluators are of Christie’s type,
another possibility is to design a structure where each of the nodes in the self-dual
graph is a ﬁve-member hierarchy. As shown in Figure 3, Christie’s unbiased screening
function is further steepened. As a result, such managers make better evaluations
of the value-in-use of resources than managers that use evaluators of similar ability
on an individual basis. On average, they well select superior bundles of resources,
which can serve as a basis for competitive advantage. In principle, the self-dual
13graph could be used repeatedly in order to approach perfect screening (Christensen
& Knudsen, 2004). In principle, perfect reliability could be achieved. For each
repeated use, the evaluation structure increases with a factor 5; very quickly, the
evaluation structure would grow to unrealistic proportions. The important point,
however, is that signiﬁcant incremental improvements can be achieved even with a
small number of agents.
4 How evaluation structures may beneﬁt search
Managerial search is commonly thought of as the dilemma of balancing exploita-
tion and exploration (Garcia, Calantone, Levine, 2003; Greve, 2003; March, 1991;
Holmqvist, 2004). The manager has to exploit what is already known about the
possible uses of a resource in order to obtain a pay-oﬀ, but he must also continue
to explore in order to discover uses that may increase the pay-oﬀ (Sutton & Barto,
2000). The dilemma is that the manager must continue to pursue some balance of
both actions in order to become successful. A variety of new possible uses (inno-
vations) must be explored while progressively selecting and implementing the most
promising (March, 1991; Sutton & Barto, 2000).
The canonical model of the exploration-exploitation dilemma is the n-armed ban-
dit problem (Sutton & Barto, 2000). In this problem, a decision-maker is repeatedly
faced with n possible actions. After each choice, the decision-maker receives a nu-
merical pay-oﬀ that depends on the particular choice that was made. The task is to
maximize the numerical pay-oﬀ. A common analogy is that of choosing among uses
of alternative medical treatments with the aim of achieving better “performance” of
patients (Sutton & Barto, 2000). In our case, the analogy is of a manager choosing
among alternative resources in order to increase the economic performance of the
ﬁrm. Exactly the same challenge is faced by the manager choosing among alterna-
tive uses of a single resource, e.g. an employee can work according to many diﬀerent
job speciﬁcations.
4.1 The model
As illustration, we chose one of the simplest ways of modelling managerial search.
We used a simple n-armed bandit with n = 11 (robustness tests show that the
results are qualitatively similar with diﬀerent values of n). The expected values of
the 11 arms were ﬁxed and uniformly distributed as Pn = {−5,...,5}. A population
of 100 managers had a ﬁxed inspection cost, k, allowing a sequence of inspections
over 1000 time-steps. The search procedure follows the speciﬁcation of Equation 1.
Initially, the manager draws a possible use of a resource at random, an innovation
with expected value µy. The expected value-in-use of a resource is constant, but
the actual value ﬂuctuates because of a random component, σ, in use-value. In a
particular time-step, t, the actual value from the resource is yt = µy ± σ.
14Then, in each subsequent time-step, the manager also draws a possible alterna-
tive with an expected value-in-use of µz and an actual value of zt = µz ±σ. On the
basis of the diﬀerence in the observed values, (zt−yt), the manager then estimates a
point probability, α = f(zt − yt), that the new use z should be adopted. A random
draw determines whether the manager decides to shift from resource y to resource
z. If it happens that the manager continues to use y over t periods, he forms a more
reliable estimate of its value. A common way to do this is by averaging the pay-oﬀs
actually received (Sutton & Barto, 2000)
y =
y1 + y2 + ... + yt
t
(10)
As t becomes very large, the estimate, y converges to the expected value µy. The
manager therefore uses y as the reservation value against which the new uses that he
explores are compared. That is, the manager uses the point probability α = f(zt−y)
to decide whether he should drop y and adopt z. Whenever the manager decides to
drop a use, y, he also remembers the estimate y.
The whole point of the exercise is to examine how managerial fallibility in eval-
uation inﬂuences performance and how evaluation structures may help fallible man-
agers improve performance. We model managerial fallibility as an imperfect screen-
ing of the diﬀerence in value of two uses of a resource, α = f(zt − y). Perfect
screening is sharp: whenever zt > y (zt 6 y), the probability, α, of accepting z is
1(0). In the case of imperfect screening, α = f(zt − y) < 1 (> 0) for some values of
zt > y (zt 6 y).
Figure 4: The six levels of judgmental ability used in the simulation.
The maximal diﬀerence in value was approximately ±(10 + 6σ).
15We examined six levels of managerial ability. The lowest level of ability was the
case of Albert in Figure 1. Albert has no discriminating ability and simply processes
signals about the value-in-use by ﬂipping a coin, f(zt − y) = 1/2. That is, Albert
accepts every new alternative with probability 1/2. The highest level of ability in
evaluating diﬀerences of value-in-use was the case of Eric in Figure 1. Eric accepts
a new alternative use, z, over an old use, y, with probability f(zt − y) = 1 (0) if
zt > y (zt 6 y). Four levels of managerial ability between Albert’s and Eric’s were
modelled as
α = f(zt − y) =
1 + tanh(j · (zt − y))
2
(11)
for j = {1/10,1/5,1,10}, where higher j is higher ability. The levels of manage-
rial ability used in the simulation are shown in Figure 4. The economic eﬀect of the
level of ability depends on size of the diﬀerences, zt − y, that a manager will face.
Almost all values fall within ±(5+3 σ). Therefore, the maximal diﬀerences are ap-
proximately ±(10+6 σ), where σ is the random component of value. A critical issue
is whether the manager is able to distinguish between neighboring values, having a
diﬀerence of 1. A standard variation of less than σ = 1/3 ensures that the manager
in most cases can distinguish between neighboring values in this model. Similarly,
a standard variation of less than σ = 3 ensures that the manager in most cases
can distinguish between extreme values in this model. On this basis, we examined
three levels of the random component in value, σ = {0.00,0.30,3.00}. A random
component of σ = 0 provides a baseline model by removing any random ﬂuctuation
in value.
As mentioned above, the diﬀerences in judgmental ability can be divided into
levels of unbiased evaluation and levels of bias. In addition to the examination of
the unbiased screening, we examined two levels of positive and negative judgmental
bias. A positive bias of, for example, 3 moves the point (x = 0,f(x) = 1/2) to
(x = 3,f(x) = 1/2). We examined the eﬀect of bias for each level of (unbiased)
managerial ability, as deﬁned in Equation 11. Simulations for two levels of positive
bias (3, 10) and two levels of negative bias (-3, -10) are reported.
A simulation examined four populations of evaluation structures, each containing
100 members with identical managerial ability. The populations in question were:
(1) single agents, (2) hierarchies, (3) polyarchies, and (4) hybrids containing both
hierarchical and polyarchical elements. Figure 2 shows examples of a hierarchy, a
polyarchy, and a hybrid. Whereas the population of single agents is well-deﬁned, the
sizes of the other evaluation structures were allowed to vary in size. The hierarchies
had randomly generated sizes of between 2 and 10 members. The minimal size of
a hierarchy is 2 and hierarchies with more than 10 members would be hard to ﬁnd
in practical applications. The population of polyarchies was generated in a similar
way, such that it had random sizes between 2 and 10. The population of hybrids was
generated by assigning a single agent plus a random number of members to random
entries in a 5×5 grid. On average, the size of a hybrid will include 13 members. In
16order to compare the viability and economic eﬀect of the diﬀerent ways of organizing
an evaluation structure, the four populations were examined in isolation.
In the case of single agents, the entity α = f(zt − y) was estimated and the
agents decided to hold on to their current innovation or to shift to a new innovation.
In the case of evaluation structures including two or more agents, the evaluation
structure was represented as a two-dimensional matrix with ones representing agents
and zeros representing an absence of members. We then designed a procedure to
extract the exact analytical expression for the evaluation structure’s graph screening
function FG(α), i.e., the reliability polynomial.3 The decision whether to explore a
new innovation or further exploit the old was based on the probability FG(α) =
FG(f(zt − y)).
Selection pressures are commonly thought to be important sources of improve-
ment in a population of innovators. We deﬁned a selection mechanism in the fol-
lowing way. In each time-step, the average economic return that a manager has
achieved at this point in time is compared to the current average result of the entire
population. The comparison is made after all managers of a population have chosen
an innovation and received their pay-oﬀ. If the manager in question does not meet
the level of the γ best members in the population, he is removed from the population
and replaced by a new manager. We examined selection pressure of γ = {0.50,0.90}.
Because the results are qualitatively similar, we only report the results from γ = 50.
In the populations of hierarchies, polyarchies and hybrids, the eﬀect of the selection
pressure was to drive the less able structures out of the population.
For each of the four populations, the parameter space to be explored included
a total of 36 combinations, i.e., six levels of managerial ability, three levels of the
random component in value (σ), and two levels of selection pressure (γ). Reliable
estimates were obtained by averaging over 100 samples for each population and for
each combination of the parameters.
In order to compare the eﬀect of evaluation structures with the commonly known
version of the bandit problem (Sutton & Barto, 2000), we conducted a series of
simulations without any selection eﬀect. In order to do this, we used performance
as a criterion to select one representative hybrid, hierarchy and polyarchy. We chose
the best hybrid in the sense that it achieved the highest performance for the least
average death rate.2 We also used this procedure to chose a size of the hierarchy and
of the polyarchy. In both cases, a structure of seven members was chosen.
3Christensen & Knudsen (2002) provides a pseudocode that can be used to develop a procedure
to accomplish this.
2 The screening polynomial of the best hybrid was:
−3α14 + 31α13 − 150α12 + 446α11 − 896α10 + 1253α9 − 1205α8 + 754α7 − 274α6 + 56α5 − 24α4
+12α3 + α2.
174.2 Results
There are three main results. First, the level and bias of managerial ability signif-
icantly inﬂuences managerial performance. Second, evaluation structures inﬂuence
managerial performance in a way that is contingent upon the nature of the envi-
ronment within which the manager works. Evaluation structures must be designed
to match the nature of the environment with respect to the competitive pressure,
the variance in outcomes and the ability of the available employees. A third result
is that selection eﬀects help a population of managers with no ability to increase
performance. All results are reported in Tables 1-3 in the Appendix.
As shown in Table 1, more ability is generally better in the sense of increasing
the economic performance for less deaths. Sometimes, however, less managerial
ability in evaluating the diﬀerence between innovations is a blessing. This is the
case when there is no selection and when screening is biased. When selection eﬀects
are absent, the population cannot beneﬁt from the exit of unsuccessful managers.
In this case, perfect screening has a detrimental eﬀect. Table 3 shows that the
decline in economic performance from an increase in the level of screening, from
A5 to A6 (perfect screening), is greatest when there is no uncertainty (σ = 0).
Perfect screening is second best because perfection decreases the level of managerial
exploration in the absence of selection eﬀects; the manager prematurely decides
to exploit a particular innovation. As the uncertainty in outcomes increases, the
selection eﬀect eﬀectively leads to more exploration, and the loss from increasing
ability diminishes.
More generally, the results of Tables 1 and 3 show that three factors jointly
determine whether the level of exploration is too high or too low: the presence
of selection eﬀects, the level of managerial ability, and the level of uncertainty in
outcomes. In the absence of selection, less than perfect ability leads to increased
performance as uncertainty goes to zero. In the presence of selection, perfect ability
leads to increased performance as uncertainty goes to zero. From a prescriptive
viewpoint, it is therefore important to emphasize the contingent nature of the eﬀects.
The manager must choose the level of ability and the evaluation structure contingent
upon the intensity of competition and the uncertainty in the value of innovations.
A bias is deﬁned with respect to the reservation value, ξ. In the present study,
we have set the reservation value to zero. We examined two forms of bias, a positive
and a negative. A positive bias of 3 moves the agent screening function to the right
such that the reservation value eﬀectively becomes, ξ0 = 3. By contrast, a negative
bias of -3 moves the moves the agent screening function to the left such that the
reservation value becomes, ξ0 = −3. For example, as shown in Figure 1, Christie
has a negative bias of -1. Simulations for two levels of positive bias (3, 10) and two
levels of negative bias (-3, -10) are reported in Table 2 in the Appendix.
More ability in judging the diﬀerence between the current innovation and a new
one is a curse when there is a strong negative bias (see Table 2). In this case,
lower ability translates into the acceptance of more valuable innovations with a
18positive probability. By contrast, a positive bias increases the economic performance
of the population. With a bias of 3, managers with ability A5, organized in a
hybrid, achieved a cumulative economic performance of 3518, an impressive average
per agent of more than 3.5 per time-step over the entire run. In comparison, the
unbiased managers with perfect screening ability achieved a cumulative economic
performance of 2050 (σ = 0). The issue here is that the manager beneﬁts from a
fairly high reservation value, ξ0 = 3. This points to the identiﬁcation of the optimal
reservation value as a critical issue in the case where managers have less than perfect
judgmental ability.
Having shown that managerial ability matters for performance, we now consider
the role of evaluation structures. First, consider the dominance of hierarchies when
the manager is a mere coin-ﬂipper of no ability. Such a manager will accept a new
alternative with probability 1/2 without consideration of its value. If the manager
has already picked an innovation with positive value, the probability of accepting a
worse innovation is higher than 1/2. This is so because there are 11 diﬀerent arms
in the model, one arm has zero value and 10 arms have symmetrically distributed
positive and negative values (±1,±2,...,±5). Whenever the manager has chosen
an arm with positive value, the probability that a random innovation has a higher
value than the current innovation is less than the probability that it has lower value.
By contrast, a manager with perfect ability to screen diﬀerences who happened to
accept an innovation with positive value will only shift to a diﬀerent innovation if
it appears to have higher value. As the ability increases, the manager will quickly
settle on an innovation with a relatively high value. A manager with less ability will
continue exploring.
The hierarchy reduces the probability of accepting any proposal in the case of
no ability. Starting from an innovation with positive value, the best strategy of
the agent with no ability is simply to reject every alternative. For this reason, the
hierarchy reduces the probability of choosing an innovation with lower value. The
superior evaluation structure for managers with no ability is the hierarchy, promoting
a strategy of choosing an innovation at random and then sticking to this innovation
forever. The hierarchy is an evaluation structure that helps achieve this because it
makes acceptance of a new innovation less likely. It is a skeptic structure that helps
maintain the status quo, and maintaining the status quo is the best option if you
have no ability in evaluating outcomes.
Obviously, rules or norms disfavoring change could be substituted for the hier-
archy. In early stages of innovation when there is high uncertainty regarding the
relative value of possible approaches to innovation, the classical managerial traits
are boldness and determination to carry out an innovation despite the risks (Schum-
peter, 1934). As Schumpeter (1934) argued, determination is crucial, ability of less
importance. Our results are consistent with Schumpeter’s (1934) arguments, but
add new insights. In the face of no ability to judge the value of innovations, the
more determined the manager, in the sense of sticking to one particular innovation,
the better. When the ability to judge the value of innovations is increased above
19level A1, we ﬁnd that the hierarchy is not necessarily the best way of organizing an
evaluation structure. In the face of selection eﬀects, the results in Table 1 show that
the hierarchy is generally the best evaluation structure, closely followed by the hy-
brid. This result is inﬂuenced by the selection eﬀect, giving rise to ﬁerce competition
among the many alternative hybrids.
When the selection pressure is removed (Table 3), we see that the hybrid is
the superior evaluation structure for low levels of ability (A2 and A3) and low
levels of uncertainty (σ = 0.00,0.30). For higher levels of ability and a high level of
uncertainty, the hierarchy again wins out. The reason is that the hierarchy decreases
managerial exploration by rejecting alternatives that are only slightly better than the
present. If ability is further increased to level A4 and A5, the evaluation structure
has no distinct eﬀect unless the manager’s ability is biased. Indeed, the importance
of evaluation structures decreases as the managerial ability increases. When the
screening is positively biased, however, the hybrid remains the superior evaluation
structure even for high levels of ability (A4 and A5 in Table 2).
Finally, the eﬀect of selection is worth noting. When managers have no ability,
they will achieve a result of zero unless there is selection. In the case of selection,
the population of managers beneﬁts from the exit of unsuccessful managers. When
managerial ability is absent, selection eﬀects are beneﬁcial. As managerial ability
increases, the gain from the exit of unsuccessful managers is lower than the loss of
value.
5 Implications for Research
The resource-based view (RBV) of strategy has mainly focussed on sustaining the
competitive advantage in ﬁrms endowed with resources that have superior value.
Indeed, the RBV is silent on antecedents to the composition of the ﬁrm’s resource
portfolio, even though in the earliest formulations of the theory (Penrose, 1959),
managerial decision making on the composition of the ﬁrm’s resource bundle is a
central component of the theory. Thus, a fundamental problem of explaining how
diﬀerential resource value is attained in the ﬁrst place remains unsolved in the RBV.
The present article contributes by identifying this gap in the RBV and advances a
perspective on evaluation of resource value that can help ﬁll it. This perspective com-
plements Makadok’s (2001, 2003) analysis of the joint eﬀect of agency problems and
uncertain expectations of resource value inﬂuencing investment in resources. The
present paper focusses squarely on the evaluation of resource value in the absence
of agency problems (a transformation of ability, T (fi) would allow representation of
agency problems in the present framework).
The evaluation perspective, outlined in the present article, traces heterogeneity
in resource value to diﬀerences in judgmental ability, both at the individual and
the organizational level. While diﬀerential judgmental ability at the individual level
gives rise to asymmetric information, evaluation structures give rise to complemen-
20tarities among individuals. Asymmetric information arises if managers have diﬀer-
ential ability in evaluating resource value (i.e., the screening functions of managers
i and j diﬀer, fi 6= fj). When such asymmetric information about resource value is
absent (fi ≡ fj), individual managers will evaluate resource value in the same way
(even though point estimates may diﬀer, the expectations will be identical). Individ-
ual managers with identical judgmental ability will therefore deploy resources in a
similar way. However, even managers with identical ability can achieve competitive
advantage if they are located in diﬀerent evaluation structures. The reason is that
evaluation structures deﬁne information ﬂows among organization members. These
information ﬂows introduce complementarities that are sources of diﬀerential out-
comes (as illustrated in our simulation model). Such complementarities are formally
expressed by the organizational level graph screening function FG. The evaluation
perspective developed in the present article thus aligns with Lippman & Rumelt’s
(2003b) conclusion that asymmetric information and complementarities are sources
of superior resource value and thus competitive advantage. The present article also
advances Lippman & Rumelt’s (2003b) analysis by pointing to ability in evaluation
and the organization of evaluation as important sources of asymmetric information
and complementarities. The conclusions oﬀered here extends to the problem of
evaluating resources that are acquired in factor markets. Diﬀerential ability and dif-
ferential ways of organizing evaluation are important sources of diﬀerential economic
rents from resources that are picked in factor markets. The problem of evaluating
resource value underlies both resource-picking and capability-building, as recently
considered by Makadok (2001).
The implications for research in the RBV are fairly straightforward. We need
empirical research that includes measures of judgmental ability and examines the
relation between evaluation structures (or voting rules) that are actually used in
business and the quality of the decisions that get made as regards resource acqui-
sition, resource divestiture, and resource deployment. A related implication can be
drawn for the empirical literature on entrepreneurial behavior, and in particular the
recent studies of corporate entrepreneurship (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999; Steven-
son & Jarillo, 1990; Zahra, 1996). Researchers of entrepreneurial behavior may ﬁnd
that both judgmental ability and evaluation structures are important determinants
of success in entrepreneurial ventures.
The analytical framework advanced here also has relevance for a broader set of
literatures. In economics, the standard model of search (Rothschild, 1974; Stigler,
1962) assumes that agents are capable of perfect evaluation of the value of alterna-
tives. Because the standard model of search is used to determine demand functions
(Rothschild, 1974), the issue of imperfect evaluation should be of considerable in-
terest, also for this topic.
The literature on organizational design has explored the issue of limited man-
agerial ability in various ways (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin
& Siggelkow, 2003), but a systematic approach to the conceptualization and mod-
elling of managerial ability in evaluating resources has not yet been developed. The
21present work provides an overarching framework that can be used to think about
these issues in a systematic way. Limited managerial (or entrepreneurial) ability
has usually been thought of as an issue of sample size. This is but one aspect of
the actual limitations, another, and so far ignored limitation, is a limited ability to
determine the value of a resource, or a particular use of a resource.
Considering limitations in managerial ability leads to additional insights regard-
ing the nature and function of organizational structures. We found that the role of
organizations in supporting fallible managers leads to design implications that com-
plement the conventional view (Miles & Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979). Hierarchies
are not only useful because they promote control, eﬃcient coordination and remedy
transaction hazards, we also found that they are sources of superior performance
in uncertain environments. This issue has been intensely debated in the literature
(Miles & Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003), however the ba-
sis for our conclusion is new, i.e., limitations in the ability to evaluate alternatives.
Whereas the extreme centralized structure, the hierarchy, was superior in a num-
ber of situations, we found that the opposite decentralized structure, the polyarchy,
did not provide an advantage under any of the contingencies we examined. This
raises some questions regarding the limits of decentralization. By contrast, hybrids
had their superior moments because they could eﬀectively increase the level of or-
ganizational ability beyond that of the individual manager. That is, we found that
hierarchies are not only means to compromise between ﬂexibility and control, they
have a diﬀerent property in enhancing managerial ability.
6 Conclusion
The issue of evaluating, discovering, and creating the value of resources is an un-
solved problem at the center of the subject of business strategy. In order to under-
stand how managers search for uses of higher value, we must understand the limits
that constrain their ability. It has been recognized that limited rationality con-
strains the sample size of the alternative uses that a manager can examine (Gavetti
& Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). The related issue
of limits constraining the manager’s ability in recognizing resource value, once a
sample of alternatives has been identiﬁed (or generated) has not been given much
attention (a recent exception is Knudsen & Levinthal, 2005). Yet, as the many
studies of entrepreneurship indicate, this issue is of critical importance in practice.
Drawing on reliability theory, the essence of managerial ability can be expressed
as the probability of making two forms of error, rejecting uses of high value (errors
of omission) and accepting uses of poor value (errors of commission). Using this
speciﬁcation, we provided a way to model diﬀerent levels of managerial ability and
showed how the eﬀect of alternative evaluation structures can be modelled.
We used the n-armed bandit problem, the canonical model of the exploration-
exploitation dilemma, to illustrate how managerial ability, along with selection ef-
22fects and uncertainty in outcomes, determined the value of the resources that were
assembled by a population of managers. The simulation also illustrated how evalua-
tion structures can help managers select innovations of better economic value. Even
if managers are homogenous in their ability to recognize the value of resources, the
particular evaluation structure within which managers are located will enhance or
decrease the joint outcome of evaluation. Thus, evaluation structures give rise to
judgmental ability at the organizational level.
The present study is motivated by a fundamental unsolved problem in the RBV
of explaining how diﬀerential resource value is attained in the ﬁrst place. The present
article contributes by identifying this gap and advancing a perspective on evaluation
of resource value that can help ﬁll it. The evaluation perspective, outlined in the
present article, traces heterogeneity in resource value to two sources, asymmetric
information and complementarities. In our analysis, asymmetric information arises
from diﬀerential judgmental ability at the individual level. Complementarities, in
contrast, arise from evaluation structures. The evaluation perspective developed in
the present article thus aligns with Lippman & Rumelt’s (2003b) conclusion that
asymmetric information and complementarities are sources of superior resource value
and thus competitive advantage.
The basis for our conclusion is entirely new and invites a fresh look on organi-
zations. Understanding the role of organization structures in remedying managerial
fallibility opens a new and fascinating subject of study that is relevant to the RBV
and a broader set of literatures mentioned in the above section on research implica-
tions. Empirical research on this topic as well as a better understanding also of the
role of evaluation structures in shaping managerial search (and sample processes)
and creativity should be high on the agenda in strategy research.
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277 Appendix
S P H Hy S P H Hy
A1, σ=0.00 125 121 238 120 4.86 4.98 4.72 5.00
A2, σ=0.00 744 722 892 871 2.62 3.30 2.69 2.99
A3, σ=0.00 1302 1243 1415 1398 2.74 4.07 2.94 3.60
A4, σ=0.00 1935 1908 1896 1975 15.11 15.05 18.06 13.22
A5, σ=0.00 1717 1736 1732 1685 31.08 29.31 30.37 31.29
A6, σ=0.00 2050 – – – 2.76 – – –
A1, σ=0.30 124 121 227 120 4.81 4.91 4.70 4.99
A2, σ=0.30 746 721 901 871 2.64 3.40 2.71 2.98
A3, σ=0.30 1288 1238 1416 1395 2.71 4.07 2.79 3.46
A4, σ=0.30 2110 2044 2143 2113 6.63 8.06 7.04 6.36
A5, σ=0.30 2130 2133 2137 2125 9.23 8.83 9.09 8.78
A6, σ=0.30 2183 – – – 5.74 – – –
A1, σ=3.00 142 140 250 137 5.38 5.45 5.27 5.51
A2, σ=3.00 700 680 818 787 3.19 3.62 3.27 3.31
A3, σ=3.00 1082 1054 1171 1161 3.02 3.65 3.18 3.13
A4, σ=3.00 1553 1536 1571 1548 3.21 3.27 3.27 3.18
A5, σ=3.00 1591 1593 1590 1591 3.28 3.21 3.25 3.21
A6, σ=3.00 1592 – – – 2.46 – – –
Table 1: Selection pressure, γ = 0.50 and three levels of uncertainty,
σ. Cumulative performance at T=1000 and mean death rates, for
each level of ability (A1= coin-ﬂipper to A6= perfect screening)
and each population of structures (S= Single agent, H= Hierarchy,
P= Polyarchy, Hy= Hybrid). Each cell contains averages of 100
samples.
28S P H Hy S P H Hy
A1, σ=0, Bias=3 124 121 223 119 4.84 4.97 4.75 5.03
A2, σ=0, Bias=3 944 921 1087 1177 2.65 3.31 2.75 3.46
A3, σ=0, Bias=3 1819 1770 1922 1902 3.87 5.09 3.98 11.62
A4, σ=0, Bias=3 3429 3325 3344 3474 13.76 13.98 13.62 12.24
A5, σ=0, Bias=3 3484 3394 3481 3518 16.59 18.46 16.45 15.30
A6, σ=0, Bias=3 3496 – – – 10.33 – – –
A1, σ=0, Bias=10 123 121 220 119 4.85 4.95 4.76 5.00
A2, σ=0, Bias=10 1296 1292 1454 1758 2.76 2.88 2.90 4.62
A3, σ=0, Bias=10 2071 2127 2138 2194 24.01 22.01 24.95 30.09
A4, σ=0, Bias=10 2712 2712 2679 2719 40.16 40.07 40.88 39.93
A5, σ=0, Bias=10 2703 2703 2680 2723 40.10 40.14 40.92 39.81
A6, σ=0, Bias=10 2686 – – – 40.67 – – –
A1, σ=0, Bias=-3 123 122 221 117 4.87 4.98 4.78 5.00
A2, σ=0, Bias=-3 547 526 681 582 2.97 3.67 3.00 3.07
A3, σ=0, Bias=-3 739 714 866 758 2.68 3.73 2.74 2.79
A4, σ=0, Bias=-3 947 917 978 944 2.68 3.39 2.78 2.70
A5, σ=0, Bias=-3 996 967 989 966 2.69 2.92 2.86 2.82
A6, σ=0, Bias=-3 789 – – – 2.13 – – –
A1, σ=0, Bias=-10 125 123 228 119 4.81 4.98 4.72 5.03
A2, σ=0, Bias=-10 223 216 308 189 3.89 4.13 3.91 4.46
A3, σ=0, Bias=-10 126 122 161 107 4.94 5.06 4.90 5.46
A4, σ=0, Bias=-10 69 70 71 70 6.49 6.46 6.46 6.47
A5, σ=0, Bias=-10 70 70 71 70 6.47 6.52 6.45 6.50
A6, σ=0, Bias=-10 71 – – – 6.48 – – –
Table 2: Biased screening and no uncertainty, σ = 0. A positive
bias of, for example, 3 moves the point (x = 0,f(x) = 1/2) to
(x = 3,f(x) = 1/2). Simulations for two levels of positive bias (3,
10) and two levels of negative bias (-3, -10) are reported. Selection
pressure, γ = 0.50. Cumulative performance at T=1000 and mean
death rates, for each level of ability (A1= coin-ﬂipper to A6= per-
fect screening) and each population of structures (S= Single agent,
H= Hierarchy, P= Polyarchy, Hy= Hybrid). Each cell contains
averages of 100 samples.
29S P H Hy
A1, σ=0.00 1 3 6 -1
A2, σ=0.00 953 887 1132 1146
A3, σ=0.00 1649 1562 1810 1858
A4, σ=0.00 2673 2636 2720 2655
A5, σ=0.00 2760 2745 2780 2733
A6, σ=0.00 2495 – – –
A1, σ=0.30 -2 -4 -5 -2
A2, σ=0.30 949 890 1130 1142
A3, σ=0.30 1647 1555 1806 1851
A4, σ=0.30 2666 2627 2711 2650
A5, σ=0.30 2738 2730 2742 2729
A6, σ=0.30 2722 – – –
A1, σ=3.00 2 4 2 -1
A2, σ=3.00 886 834 1034 1027
A3, σ=3.00 1390 1327 1507 1493
A4, σ=3.00 1980 1949 2009 1966
A5, σ=3.00 2025 2023 2025 2019
A6, σ=3.00 2008 – – –
Table 3: Standard run with no deaths, i.e., selection pressure, γ =
0 and three levels of uncertainty, σ. Cumulative performance at
T=1000 and mean death rates, for each level of ability (A1= coin-
ﬂipper to A6= perfect screening) and each population of structures
(S= Single agent, H= Hierarchy, P= Polyarchy, Hy= Hybrid). Each
cell contains averages of 100 samples.
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